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Abstract
Whereas the embedding distortion, the payload and the robustness of digital watermarking schemes
are well understood, the notion of security is still not completely well defined. The approach proposed
in the last five years is too theoretical and solely considers the embedding process, which is half of
the watermarking scheme. This paper proposes a new measurement of watermarking security, called the
effective key length, which captures the difficulty for the adversary to get access to the watermarking
channel. This new methodology is applied to additive spread spectrum schemes where theoretical and
practical computations of the effective key length are proposed. It shows that these schemes are not
secure as soon as the adversary gets observations in the Known Message Attack context.
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The Effective Key Length of Watermarking
Schemes
I. INTRODUCTION
From the early beginning of its history, watermarking has been characterized by a trade-off between the
embedding distortion and the capacity. The embedding distortion counts how hiding messages degrades
the host contents. The capacity is the theoretical amount of hidden data that can be reliably transmitted
when facing an attack of a given strength. In practice, the operating point of a watermarking technique is
defined by the embedding distortion, the payload, and the robustness. These are well defined and gauged,
for instance, by a Document to Watermarking power Ratio DWR, a number of bits per host samples, and
a Symbol Error Rate SER at a given Watermark to Noise power Ratio WNR.
Security came as a fourth feature stemming from applications where these exist attackers willing to
circumvent watermarking such as copy and/or copyright protection. The efforts of the pioneering works
introducing this new concept first focused on stressing the distinction between security and robustness.
An early definition of security was coined by Ton Kalker as the inability by unauthorized users to have
access to the raw watermarking channel [1].
The problem addressed in this paper is the following: the methodology to assess the security levels
of watermarking schemes, proposed in [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], poorly captures T. Kalker’s definition. In a
nutshell, the methodology proposed in these papers is based on C. E. Shannon’s definition of security
for symmetric crypto-systems [7]. The security level is defined as the amount of uncertainty the attacker
has about the secret key. This is measured by the equivocation which is the entropy of the key knowing
some observations such as contents watermarked with the same technique and the same secret key.
Section II-A presents this past approach in more details and shows a surprising fact: this methodology
only takes into account the embedding side. How could it capture the ‘access to raw watermarking channel’
in Kalker’s definition if just half of the scheme is considered? Obviously, the decoding process should also
play a role. Translating the theoretical foundations of cryptography security of [7] in watermarking terms
may not have been a good idea. Indeed, watermarking and symmetric cryptography strongly disagree in
the following point: In symmetric cryptography, the deciphering key is unique and is the ciphering key.
Therefore, inferring this key from the observations (here, say some cipher texts) is the main task of the
attacker. The disclosure of this key grants the adversary the access to the crypto-channel. In watermarking,
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several keys indeed can reliably decode hidden messages. Therefore, the precise disclosure of the secret
key used at the embedding side is a possible way to get access to the watermarking channel, but it may
not be the only one.
As a solution, this article proposes an alternative methodology to assess the security level of a
watermarking scheme as detailed in Sect. II-B. In brief, our approach is based on the probability P that
the adversary finds a key that grants him the access to the watermarking channel as wished by Kalker:
either a key decoding hidden messages embedded with the true secret key, either a key embedding
messages that will be decoded with the true secret key. This gives birth to the concept of equivalent
keys presented in Sect. III. Our new definition of the security level is called the effective key length
and is quantified by ` = − log2(P ) in bits. This transposes the notion of cryptographic key length to
watermarking: the bigger the effective key length, the smaller the probability of finding an equivalent
key. This alternative methodology equally takes into account the embedding and the decoding sides. It
is also simpler because it is not based on information theoretical notions and it allows to evaluate the
effective key length experimentally (see Sect. V).
The contributions of the paper are the following:
● A new methodology to estimate the security levels of watermarking schemes based on the definition
of equivalent keys, the probability of finding such an equivalent key, and its translation in bits
(Sect. III).
● The application of this methodology to the Spread Spectrum (SS) watermarking scheme giving close
form expressions of the effective key length in Sect. IV.
● An experimental setup of Sect. V for estimating the effective key length with a comparison to the
previous theoretical expressions.
● The comparison of SS and ISS (Improved Spread Spectrum) watermarking techniques given in
Sect. VI.
● The definitive evidence that these watermarking schemes have low security levels as soon as the
adversary can get observations.
II. WATERMARKING SECURITY
This section details the methodology proposed so far to evaluate the security levels of watermarking
schemes, and then it reviews our proposal.
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A. The past approach
We model the host by a vector x in set X extracted from a block of content. Given a secret key k,
the embedding modifies this signal into vector y to hide message m: y = e(x,m,k). The secret key is
usually a signal: In spread spectrum schemes [8], the secret key is the set of carriers; in Quantization
Index Modulation schemes [9], [10], it is the dither randomizing the quantization. This signal is usually
generated at the embedding and decoding sides thanks to a pseudo-random generated fed by a seed.
However, the attacker has no interest in disclosing this seed, because, by analyzing watermarked contents,
it is usually simpler to directly estimate k without knowing this seed.
The attacker may disclose different kinds of information about the secret key. First, he might get no
information at all. This has been qualified as perfect covering in [2] or stego-security in [5]. This happens
when there is a total lack of identificability of the secret key. A partial lack of identificability stems in
different classes of security where the attacker only learns that the secret key lies in a given subset. For
instance, in a spread spectrum scheme, he may learn that the watermark is added in a given subspace,
however he may not identify the secret carriers up to a rotation matrix in this subspace. This is defined
as subspace security in [5].
The application of the information theoretic approach of C. E. Shannon allowed to quantify water-
marking security levels [2], [6], [3], [4]. This theory regards the signals used at the embedding as random
variables (r.v.). Let us denote K the r.v. associated to the secret key, K the space of the secret keys, X
the r.v. associated to the host, X the space of the hosts. Before producing any watermarked content, the
designer draws the secret key k according to a given distribution pK. The adversary knows K and pK
but he doesn’t know the instantiation k. This lack of knowledge is measured in bits by the entropy of
the key H(K) ≜ − ⨋K pK(k) log2 pK(k) (i.e., an integral if K is a continuous r.v. or a sum if K is a
discrete r.v.).
Now, suppose the adversary sees No observations denoted as ONo = {O1, . . . ,ONo}. The question is
whether this key will remain a secret once the attacker gets these observations. These include at least
some watermarked contents which have been produced by the same embedder (same algorithm e(⋅),
same secret key k). These are also regarded as r.v. Y. The observations may also encompass some other
data depending on the attack setup (see definitions of WOA, KMA, KOA in [2]).
By carefully analyzing these observations, the attacker might deduce some information about the
secret key. The adversary can refine his knowledge about the key by constructing a posteriori distribution
pK(k∣ONo). The information leakage is given by the mutual information between the secret key and
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the observations I(K;ONo), and the equivocation he(No) ≜ H(K∣ONo) determines how this leakage
decreases the initial lack of information: he(No) = H(K) − I(K;ONo). The equivocation is always a
non increasing function. Three things needs to be known to compute these quantities: the distribution
of the keys pK, the distribution of the host signals pX and the embedding equation e(⋅). With this
formulation, a perfect covering is tantamount to I(K;ONo) = 0. Yet, for most of the watermarking
schemes, the information leakage is not null. If identificability is granted, the equivocation about the
secret key decreases down to 0 (K is a discrete r.v.) or −∞ (K is a continuous r.v.) as the adversary
keeps on observing more data. This information theoretic framework to assess watermarking security
has been applied to popular watermarking schemes such as additive Spread-Spectrum (SS) [6], [3], or
DC-QIM (Distortion Compensated Quantization Index Modulation) [4], [11].
This framework is fruitful to establish if a watermarking scheme is perfectly secure and, if not, to
compare the information leakage of different systems. Nevertheless, it brings little information regarding
T. Kalker’s basic definition of security, e.g. the ability of the adversary to have access to the watermarking
channel. Indeed, this methodology only needs pX, pK and e(⋅) to derive the distribution of the observations
and, in the end, the equivocation. The decoding side is not taken into account. Yet, in practice, the
estimation of the secret key is only an intermediate goal for the adversary. The equivocation above
defined can be linked to the accuracy of this estimation. However, very few works studied the impact of
the estimation accuracy on the ability of an unauthorized access to the watermarking channel.
B. Our proposal
If we look at symmetric cryptography, the security is in direct relationship with the length of the secret
key. The key length ` in bits defines the number of possible secret keys as binary words of ` bits. The
key length provides the maximum number of tests in logarithmic scale of the brute force attack which
finds the key by scanning the ∣K∣ potential keys [12]. The stopping condition has little importance. One
often assumes that the adversary tests keys until decoded messages are meaningful. We can also rephrase
this with probability: If the adversary draws a key uniformly, the probability to pick the secret key is
P = 2−`, or in logarithmic scale − log2(P ) = ` bits. With the help of some observations, the goal of the
cryptanalysts is to find attacks requiring less operations than the brute force attack. A good cryptosystem
has a security close to their key length and observing cipher texts is almost useless. For instance, the
best attack so far on one version of the Advanced Encryption Standard using 128 bits secret key offers
a computational complexity of 2126.1 [13]. Studying security within a probabilistic framework has also
been done in other fields of cryptography (for instance, in authentication [14]).
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Our idea is to transpose the notion of key length to watermarking. A crude try is to take the size of
the seed of the pseudo-random generator as it is the maximum number of tests of a brute force attack
scanning all the seeds. Yet, it doesn’t take into account how the secret key is derived from the seed.
Another though would be to take the dimension of the space K, but again, it does not consider how
watermarking uses the secret key. We think that the best approach relies on a probabilistic framework
and on the fact that, in watermarking, the secret key may not be unique in some sense. Denote by mˆ
the message decoded from y with the secret key k: mˆ = d(y,k). We expect that mˆ =m, but this might
be the case for another decoding key k′. This raises the concept of equivalent keys: for instance, k′ is
equivalent to the secret key k if it grants the decoding of almost all contents watermarked with k. This
idea was first mentioned in [15], where the authors made the first distinction between the key lengths
in cryptography and watermarking. The fact that the decoding key might not be unique creates a big
distinction with cryptography. However, the rationale of the brute force attack still holds. The attacker
proposes a test key k′ and we assume there is a genie telling him whether k′ is equivalent to k. In other
words, the security of a scheme does not rely on the difficulty of knowing whether k′ is an equivalent
key, but on the rarity of such keys: The lower the probability P of k′ being equivalent to k, the more
secure is the scheme. We propose to define the effective key length as a logarithmic measure of this
probability. Note that in our proposal, we must pay attention to the decoding algorithm d(⋅) because it
is central to the definition of equivalent keys.
Like in the previous methodology, the attack setup (WOA, KMA, KOA) determines the data from
which the test key is derived. In this paper, we restrict our attention to the Known Message Attack
(KMA - an observation is a pair of a watermarked content and the embedded message: Oi = {yi,mi}).
Assessing the security of watermarking within a probabilistic framework is not new. S. Katzenbeisser
has also listed the drawbacks of the information theoretic past approach [16]. He especially outlined the
lack of assumption on the computing power of the attacker. He then proposed to gauge security as the
advantage of the attacker. In a first step, the adversary, modeled by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing
machine, observes contents watermarked with the secret key k1 or k2. Then, the designer produces a
new piece of content y and challenges the adversary whether y has been watermarked with key k1 or
k2. The advantage is defined as the probability of a right guess minus 1/2. One clearly sees that a strictly
positive advantage implies that the adversary has been able to infer some information about the secret
key during the first step. However, the relationship with its ability to access the watermarking channel is
not straightforward: the decoding is not considered, and the notion of equivalent keys is missing.
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III. DEFINITION OF THE EFFECTIVE KEY LENGTH
This section explains the concept of equivalent keys necessary to define the effective key length. We
define by Dm(k) ⊂ X the decoding region associated to the message m and for the key k by:
Dm(k) ≜ {y ∈ X ∶ d(y,k) =m}. (1)
The topology and location of this region in X depends of the decoding algorithm and of k.
To hide message m, the encoder pushes the host vector x deep inside Dm(k), and this creates an
embedding region Em(k) ⊆ X :
Em(k) ≜ {y ∈ X ∶ ∃x ∈ X s.t. y = e(x,m,k)}. (2)
A watermarking scheme provides robustness by embedding in such a way that the watermarked contents
are located far away from the boundary of the decoding region. If the vector extracted from an attacked
content z = y+n goes out of Em(k), z might still be in Dm(k) and the correct message is decoded. For
some watermarking schemes (like QIM), we have Em(k) ⊆ Dm(k). Therefore, there might exist another
key k′ such that Em(k′) ⊆ Dm(k). A graphical illustration of this phenomenon is depicted on Fig. 1.
However, in general even if there is no noise, Em(k) /⊂ Dm(k), and we define the Symbol Error Rate
(SER) in the noiseless case as η(0) ≜ P [d(e(X,M,k),k) ≠M]. Capital letters X and M explicit the
fact that the probability is over two r.v.: the host and the message to be embedded.
Dm(k )
Dm(k)
Em(k)
Dm(k”)
Fig. 1. Graphical representation in space X of three decoding regions Dm(k), Dm(k′) and Dm(k′′) and the embedding
region Em(k,0): the key k′ belongs the equivalent decoding region K(d)eq (k,0) which is not the case for k′′.
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We now define the equivalent keys and the associated equivalent region. We make the distinction
between the equivalent decoding keys (the equivalent decoding region) and the equivalent embedding
keys (resp. the equivalent embedding region).
The set of equivalent decoding keys K(d)eq (k, ) ⊂ K with 0 ≤  is the set of keys that allows a decoding
of the hidden messages embedded with k with a probability bigger than 1 − :
K(d)eq (k, ) = {k′ ∈ K ∶ P [d(e(X,M,k),k′) ≠M] ≤ }. (3)
In the same way, the set of equivalent encoding keys K(e)eq (k, ) ⊂ K is the set of keys that allow to
embed messages which are reliably decoded with key k:
K(e)eq (k, ) = {k′ ∈ K ∶ P [d(e(X,M,k′),k) ≠M] ≤ }. (4)
These sets are not empty for  ≥ η(0) since k is then an element. One expects that, for a sound design,
these sets are empty for  < η(0). Note that for  = 0, these two definitions are equivalent to:
K(d)eq (k,0) = {k′ ∈ K ∶ Em(k′) ⊆ Dm(k)}, (5)
and K(e)eq (k,0) = {k′ ∈ K ∶ Em(k) ⊆ Dm(k′)}. (6)
Keq(k,  )
K
g(ONo)
k
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the key space K and the equivalent region Keq(k). The dotted boundary represents the
support of the generative function g(ONo) which is used to draw new keys when the adversary get observations.
The effective key length of a watermarking scheme is now defined using theses definitions. The
adversary draws a key k′ ∈ K taking into account the set of observations ONo with a generative function
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K′ = g(ONo). The function g(⋅) is either deterministic or stochastic (such that K′ ∼ p(k∣ONo) for
instance). A graphical example of the key space K and the equivalent region Keq(k) is depicted on
Fig. 2 together with the support region of a potential generative function.
The probability P (d)(,No) (or P (e)(,No)) that the adversary picks up a key belonging to the
equivalent decoding region (resp. equivalent embedding region) is:
P (d)(,No) = EK[EONo [EK′[K′ ∈ K(d)eq (K, )∣ONo]]], (7)
and similarly for P (e)(,No). Finally, by analogy with cryptography, the effective key length translates
this probability into bits as follows:
`(d)(,No) ≜ − log2(P (d)(,No)) bits, (8)
and similarly for `(e)(,No). Note also that for some watermarking schemes, we have K(e)eq (k, ) =K(d)eq (k, ). There is then no need to make a distinction and we will denote the probability and the
effective key length as P (,No) and `(,No). Additionally, we call `(,0) the basic key length, i.e. the
effective key length of a watermarking system when no observation is available.
We conclude this section by stating that the size of the seed is the maximum value of the effective key
length. We assume that the pseudo-random generator is public (Kerckhoff’s principle) so that nothing
prevents the attacker from using this generator. If any different two seeds produce two different secret
keys, then a brute force attack on the seed yields a key length of the size of the seed. Nevertheless,
the attacker may work with a different pseudo-random generator. The theoretical study below assumes
that he uses a perfectly random generator giving K′ ∼ pK for No = 0, or that he uses K′ = g(ONo) for
No > 0. In practice, the value of the effective key length should be clipped to the size of the seed in bits.
IV. THEORETICAL EFFECTIVE KEY LENGTH COMPUTATIONS
The goal of this section is to compute the expressions of the key length for the most popular class of
watermarking schemes: additive spread-spectrum.
A. The equivalent region
Consider a spread spectrum one-bit watermarking s.t. y = e(x,m,k) = x+ (−1)mαk, with m ∈ {0,1}.
The host is modeled by a white Gaussian vector of size Nv and power σ2X . The secret key is a pseudo-
random unitary vector (∥k∥ = 1) and K is consequently the unit hyper-sphere. The parameter α controls
the Document to Watermark power Ratio with the following relation:
α = √NvσX10− DWR20 . (9)
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The decoder is correlation based: d(y,k) = 0 if y⊺k > 0, 1 else. We assume that y is corrupted by an
independent white Gaussian noise of power σ2N . The SER is given by
η(σN) = Φ⎛⎝− α√σ2X + σ2N ⎞⎠ (10)
with Φ(⋅) the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal random variable. Eq. (9) and (10)
show that the robustness of the scheme quantified by η(σN) is an increasing function of Nv.
The adversary uses the same encoding or decoding functions but with a different key k′ with ∥k′∥ = 1.
We restrict our attention to the equivalent decoding keys. The reason is that K(d)eq (k, ) = K(e)eq (k, )
because d(e(x,m,k′),k) and d(e(x,m,k),k′) have identical pdfs. We define by θ the angle between
k and k′: cos θ = k⊺k′. The adversary’s decoding statistic is y⊺k′ ∼ N ((−1)mα cos θ, σ2X) and his SER
is
 = Φ(−α cos θ
σX
) . (11)
For a given  ≥ η(0), k′ is an equivalent key if its angle with k is lower than
θ ≜ arccos (−Φ−1()σX/α) (12)
= arccos(−Φ−1()√
Nv
10
DWR
20 ). (13)
Keq(,k) is the intersection of the unit hypersphere and the single inner hypercone of axis k and angle
θ, i.e. a spherical cap.
B. The basic key length
For No = 0, the probability that a key k′ uniformly distributed over K is inside Keq(,k) is the ratio
of the solid angle of this spherical cap and the full hypersphere (see Appendix A):
PSS(,0) = 1 − Icos2(θ)(1/2, (Nv − 1)/2)
2
, (14)
where I(⋅) is the regularized incomplete beta function. Fig. 4 shows that, contrary to η(σN), the basic
key length is a decreasing function of Nv for fixed  and DWR. This illustrates the trade-off between
security and robustness. Appendix A gives the asymptotical value of the basic key length:
lim
Nv→∞PSS(,0) = 12 (1 − erf(∣Φ−1()∣√2 10 DWR20 )) . (15)
This means that SS schemes become more robust as Nv →∞ but their basic key length does not vanish
to 0.
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C. Key length for No > 0
For No > 0, we suppose without loss of generality that the embedded messages were all set to 0 (if
not, we work with (−1)mi .yi). One possible estimator kˆ is to compute the average of {yi}Noi=1 and to
normalize it. The probability of this estimation being inside Keq(,k) is approximated by the cumulative
distribution function of a non-central F-distribution variable of degrees of freedom ν1 = 1, ν2 = Nv − 1
and noncentrality parameter λ = α2Noσ2X , weighted by the probability P [k′⊺k > 0] (see Appendix A):
PSS(,No) ≈ [1 − F ( (Nv−1) cos2(θ)1−cos2(θ) ; 1,Nv − 1, λ)]∗Φ (√λ) . (16)
The experimental work below shows that this approximation is indeed very accurately in our setup.
V. PRACTICAL EFFECTIVE KEY LENGTH COMPUTATIONS
Depending of the watermarking scheme, the effective key length defined by (8) may not have a literal
formula and this section aims at giving an experimental setup for its estimation. We first propose a general
framework with a high complexity. For the case of additive spread spectrum, some simplifications occur
and stems into a more practical experimental setup.
A. The general framework
If we are not limited in term of computational power, the probability P (d)(,No) can be approximated
using a classical Monte-Carlo method. We first generate a set of N1 random secret keys {ki}N1i=1. For
each of them, we also generate N2 test keys {k′i,j}N2j=1. Then, an estimation is:
Pˆ (d)(,No) = 1
N1N2
N1∑
i=1
N2∑
j=1u
(d)(k′i,j , ), (17)
where
u(d)(k′i,j , ) = 1 if k′i,j ∈ K(d)eq (ki, )= 0 else. (18)
The probability P (e)(,No) is respectively approximated using the indicator function u(e)(⋅) of K(e).
For No = 0, each test key k′i,j is independently drawn according to pK. For No > 0, we first generate
a set of No observations ONoi depending on ki, and we resort to a specific estimator to construct k
′
i,j =
g(ONoi ) (see Sec. III).
Secondly, the equivalent region may not have a defined indicator function. In this case, we generate
Nt other contents {y`}Nt`=1 watermarked with ki (resp. original contents) and the test is satisfied if at
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least (1 − )Nt contents are correctly decoded (respectively embedded) using k′i,j . Mathematically, for
the decoding equivalence:
k′i,j ∈ K(d)eq (ki, ) ≈ ∣{y` ∈ Dm`(k′i,j)}∣ > (1 − )Nt. (19)
In this case an estimation of P (d)(,No) needs N1(N2No+Nt) embeddings and N1N2Nt decodings. Due
to the limitation of the Monte-Carlo method, N1N2 should be in the order of 1/P (d)(,No) for having
a meaningful relative variance of the estimation. The parameter Nt should also be quite big for having
a good approximation of the indicator function of K(d)eq (ki, ). It is reasonable to take Nt = O(cNv) for
some constant c where Nv is the dimension of the space X containing Dm`(k′i,j).
This procedure is generic and it blindly resorts to the embedding and the decoding algorithms as black
boxes. If we have some knowledge about the watermarking technique, some tricks reduce the complexity
of the estimation. First, the probability of finding an equivalent key might not depend on ki, so that
we can restrict to N1 = 1 original key. This is the case for spread spectrum technique. For No = 0, the
probability to be estimated may be very weak and out of reach of the Monte-Carlo method. We can use
rare event probability estimator such as the one proposed in [17]. Last but not least, for a given k′i,j , the
geometry of Dm(k′i,j) can help reducing Nt and still obtaining a good approximation of the indicator
function of K(d)eq (ki, ). The following subsections put into practice these simplifications for the additive
spread spectrum technique.
B. Approximation of the equivalent region K(d)eq
The equivalent region K(d)eq depends on the embedding and decoding. For the additive spread spectrum,
both processes are so simple that we were able to derive closed-form formula of the probability in Sect. IV.
We suppose now that the embedding is more complex which prevents theoretical derivations. We will
pretend in Sect. VI that the Improved Spread Spectrum proposed in [18] plays the role of such an
embedding.
For a given host x, we can always express the result of the embedding as
y = e(x,m,k) = a(x,m)k + b(x,m)u(x,m), (20)
where k⊺u(x,m) = 0. The decoding with k′ is based on the quantity:
y⊺k′ = a(x,m) cos(θ) + b(x,m).(k′⊺u(x,m)), (21)
whose sign yields the decoded bit mˆ. It is important to note that the decoding step using a test key k′ can
be performed in a 2 dimensional space spanned by (k,u(x,m)). The Symbol Error Rate is expressed
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in term of the CDF of the statistical r.v. Y⊺k′ which depends on θ, and is thus denoted SER(θ). For
θ = 0, we have SER(0) = η(0). For  ≥ η(0), we define
θ = max
SER(θ)= θ. (22)
This shows that the equivalent decoding region is a hypercone of axis k and angle θ which depends on
the embedding. The only thing we need is to experimentally estimate angle θ. Then, we use Eq. (14)
in order to obtain an approximation of the effective key length.
The estimation of θ is made under the following rationale. A vector y watermarked by k with m = 1
is correctly decoded by any k′ s.t. k′⊺k ≥ cos(θ) if its angle φ with k is such that φ ∈ [θ−pi/2, θ+pi/2]
(see Fig. 3). In practice, we generate Nt contents {yi}Nti=1 watermarked with m = 1, and we compute
their angles {φi}Nti=1 with k. Once sorted in increasing order, we iteratively find the angle φmin such that
int((1 − )Nt) vectors have their angle φ ∈ [φmin − pi/2, φmin + pi/2] and set θˆ = pi/2 − φmin.
A much lower number of vectors is needed to accurately estimate one parameter than a full region
of the space. Nt and Nv directly impact the accuracy of θˆ, but since this boils down to the estimation
of a single parameter, the magnitude of Nt is rather low in comparison with the effective key length.
For example, at Nv = 60 and DWR = 10 dB, we generate Nt = 106 contents in order to obtain a reliable
effective key length of more than 100 bits, whereas an estimation based on (19) would have required
Nt ≈ 2` × 103 ≈ 1033 contents. Moreover, the angle θ is the same for any k, so the estimation is done
only once. This avoids the counting of correct decodings over Nt vectors of (19).
C. Rare event probability estimator
A fast rare event probability estimator1 is described in [19]. We explain its application for the case
No = 0. This algorithm estimates the probability P [s(K′) > 0] under K′ ∼ pK. It needs three ingredients:
the generation of test keys distributed according to pK, the distribution invariant modification of test
keys, and the soft score function s(⋅).
We work with an auxiliary random vector W ∼ N (0, INv). The generator draws W and outputs
a test key K′ = W/∥W∥. Since the distribution of W is isotropic, K′ is uniformly distributed over
the hypersphere. The algorithm draws n such test keys, and iteratively modifies those having a low
score. The modification takes back W, adds an independent noise N ∼ N (0, INv), and scales the result:
W′ = (W + µN)/√1 + µ2. Parameter µ controls the strength of the modification. In the end, it returns
1available as a Matlab toolbox at www.irisa.fr/texmex/people/furon/src.html
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Fig. 3. Projections of Nt = 5000 watermarked vectors (Nv = 60, m = 1) on k and u⊥, DWR = 10 dB, Nv = 60,  = 10−2. The
vector k′max correctly decodes [(1 − )Nt] contents.
a new test key W′/∥W′∥. For any value of µ, the modification lets the distribution invariant because
W′ ∼ N (0, INv). The properties of this algorithm depends on n as given in [19]. Qualitatively, the bigger
n is, the more accurate but slower is this estimator.
We propose two score functions depending on whether we know the equivalent region K(d)eq :
1) K(d)eq is known (Sect. IV) or approximated (Sect. V-B): the score function is simply a metric between
the test key and the border of the equivalent region: s(K′) =K′⊺k − cos(θˆ). In the end, the algorithm
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returns an estimation of P [cos(θ) > cos(θˆ)] when K′ is uniformly distributed over the hypersphere.
2) K(d)eq is not known: We generate Nt contents {yi}Nti=1 watermarked with k, and the score function
is the int(Nt)-th smallest ‘distance’ from these vectors to the set Dm(k′), where int(.) denotes the
closest integer function. For SS or ISS, this ‘distance’ is for instance the correlation k′⊺y. In the end, the
algorithm returns an estimation that int((1− )Nt) vectors are correctly decoded, when K′ is uniformly
distributed over the hypersphere.
VI. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The goal of the experimental part is twofold. First, we wish to assess the soundness of the experimental
measurement of the effective key length. This is done by a comparison to the theoretical results for
the additive Spread Spectrum. Second, we would like to illustrate the trade-off between security and
robustness. Third, we compare the additive Spread Spectrum (SS) to the Improved Spread Spectrum
(ISS) [18].
In the latter method, the embedding has two parameters (β, γ): e(x,m,k) = x+(−1)m(β−γ(x⊺k))k.
For a fair comparison, the parameters Nv, , σX and DWR are fixed. This implies that
α2 = β2 + γ2σ2X = Nvσ2X10− DWR10 . (23)
The robustness is gauged by using a AWGN channel of variance σ2N giving a Watermark to Noise Ratio
WNR = 10 log10(σ2W /σ2N) dB. As for the security, we use Nt = 106 contents to estimate θˆ for No = 0 as
explained in Sect. V-B. The two embedding functions, SS and ISS, produce different angles. Then, the
rare event probability estimator is used as described in Sect. V-C with n = 80. For No > 0, the attacker’s
key estimator g(⋅) is just the normalized average of vectors {(−1)miyi}Noi=1 as explained in App. A. It
appears that the probabilities to be estimated are dramatically bigger, and the Monte Carlo method of
Sect. V-A is good enough.
A. The impact of embedding parameters Nv and DWR
Fig. 4 points out the decrease of the basic key length w.r.t. Nv for a constant embedding distortion.
Contrary to a statement of [15, Sec. 4.1], the effective key length is not proportional to Nv. We can also
note the relatively fast convergence to the strictly positive asymptote (15), especially at high embedding
distortions. Fig. 5 highlights the decrease of this asymptotic key length with the embedding distortion.
The basic key length is computationally significant, say above 64 bits, only for DWR greater than 12 dB
for  = 0.01. If the watermarking technique is such that a lower DWR remains imperceptible, it should
not be recommended from a security point of view.
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Fig. 4. The basic key lengths for  = 10−2 and DWR ∈ {8,10,12} using the theoretical expression (14) (plain lines), estimation
of the equivalent region presented in Sect. V-B with Nt = 106 (○) and rare event analysis presented in Sect. V-C2 (⋆) with
Nt = 5.104 and n = 80. The horizontal dotted lines are the asymptotes (15).
B. The impact of security parameters  and No
The decrease of the basic key length with  is confirmed on Fig. 5. This is not a surprise: the more
stringent the access to the watermarking channel, the higher the security is.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 illustrate the dramatical decrease of the effective key length when observations are
available in the KMA context. For example, at DWR = 10 dB, Nv = 300 and  = 10−2, the effective key
length drops from roughly 50 bits to 8 bits for No = 1 and nearly 0 bits for 10 observations. In brief,
SS watermarking is not secure if the attacker gets observations. Note also that the approximation (16) is
very close to the Monte Carlo estimations.
1) The interplay between security and robustness: Fig. 8 shows the trade-off between robustness
measured by η(0) and security gauged by `. For a given robustness, the longer the host, the better the
security and the smaller the distortion of the scheme. Conversely, to decrease η(0) while keeping the
basic key length constant, it is better to increase Nv than to increase the distortion. This is due to the
fact that the effective key length decreases to a strictly positive value w.r.t. Nv but on the other hand
decreases to zero w.r.t. the embedding distortion. Fig. 8 highlights that ` and Nv both decrease w.r.t the
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Fig. 5. Basic key length for hosts of infinite length given in (15).
distortion at a constant robustness, as already suggested by Fig. 5.
We now compare SS with ISS regarding both security and robustness. Fig. 10 shows that the host
rejection parameter λ has a negative impact on the key length and a mitigated positive impact on the
robustness. At low WNR regimes, two different λ may give the same robustness but two different effective
key lengths. One should consequently choose the λ parameter maximizing the security in this case.
2) The validity of the practical approaches: The practical methods (Monte-Carlo, rare-event estimator
or equivalent region estimation) match the literal formula (14) and (16) either for small or large effective
key lengths on Figures 4, 6 and 7. The rare event estimator (Sect. V-C2) and the estimator based on θˆ
(Sect. V-B) are particularly accurate for large key lengths (see Figures 4 and 10), whereas the Monte-Carlo
estimator is more efficient for small key length (see Figures 6 and 7).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new measure called the effective key length to characterize wa-
termarking security. Contrary to symmetric cryptography, there are several keys granting to access to
the watermarking channel. This gives birth to the notion of equivalent keys. The effective key length
represents the difficulty of finding such a key.
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Fig. 6. Key lengths for  = 10−2, No = 1, and different DWR using approximation (16) and Monte-Carlo simulations of
Sect. V-A (◇) with N1 = 1 and N2 = 106.
We have computed the effective key length theoretically and practically for additive spread spectrum
schemes. The main conclusions of this specific analysis are the following. For a constant error rate against
the AWGN channel, the effective key length increases w.r.t. the length of the host and decreases w.r.t.
the distortion. Contrary to what was stated in [15], the effective key length is not proportional to the size
of the host. The decrease of the effective key length is dramatic regarding the number of observations
in the KMA context, which strongly supports the idea of changing the embedding key as frequently as
possible.
Our future work will apply this methodology to other watermarking schemes (such as DC-QIM) but
also to other scenario attacks such as the Oracle attack.
APPENDIX A
PROBABILITIES FOR SPREAD SPECTRUM
Let X ∼ N (µe1, σ2INv), where e1 is the first vector of the canonical basis of RNv . The appendix
gives the probability that the normalized correlation D = X⊺e1/∥X∥ is above a threshold τ . A simpler
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Fig. 7. Key lengths for  = 10−2, No = 10, and different DWR using approximation (16) and Monte-Carlo simulations of
Sect. V-A (◇) with N1 = 1 and N2 = 106.
problem is the computation of:
P [D2 > τ2] = P⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ X
2
1∑Nvi=1X2i > τ2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ (24)
= P⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ X
2
1∑Nvi=2X2i > τ
2
1 − τ2 ⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ (25)
= P⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣ X
2
1(Nv − 1)−1∑Nvi=2X2i > (Nv − 1)τ
2
1 − τ2 ⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦ (26)
Denote F = X21(Nv−1)−1∑Nvi=2X2i . For µ = 0, F is the ratio of two independent χ2 random variables of degree
of freedom ν1 = 1 and ν2 = Nv − 1, thus it is distributed as a Snedecor F-distribution F (1,Nv − 1) [20,
26.6], whose CDF is given by a regularized incomplete beta function I x
x+Nv−1 (1/2, (Nv − 1)/2), and
P [D2 > τ2] = 1 − Iτ2(1/2, (Nv − 1)/2). (27)
This is the probability that a centered white Gaussian vector lies inside a two-nappe hypercone of angle
arccos(τ). By symmetry around the origin, we have for the single nappe hypercone P [D > τ] = (1 −
Iτ2(1/2, (Nv − 1)/2))/2. This holds indeed for any random vector X whose distribution is symmetric
wrt to the origin, and in particular for a uniform distribution over the hypersphere. This proves (14) if
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Fig. 8. Trade-off between robustness and security. The plot is computed by varying DWR ; the ticks show the values of DWR
for η(0) = 10−7.
one sets k = e1 and τ = cos(θ). Another point is that as Nv → ∞, the distribution of F converges to
a χ21 distribution [20, 26.6.11] while the RHS of the inequality in (26) converges to κ
2 if τ = κ/√Nv.
Therefore, limNv→∞ P [D > τ] = (1 − erf(∣κ∣/√2))/2. This proves (15) because cos θ = κ/√Nv due
to (13).
For µ > 0, F has a non-central F-distribution with noncentrality parameter λ = µ2/σ2 and degrees of
freedom ν1 = 1 and ν2 = Nv − 1, whose CDF is denoted by F (x; 1,Nv − 1, λ). Therefore,
P [D2 > τ2] = 1 − F ((Nv − 1)τ2
1 − τ2 ; 1,Nv − 1, λ) . (28)
However, the argument of symmetry no longer holds for deriving P [D > τ]. We propose to write:
P [D > τ] = P [(D2 > τ2)&(D > 0)] (29)
= P [D2 > τ2∣D > 0] .P [D > 0] (30)
≈ P [D2 > τ2] .P [D > 0] , (31)
with P [D > 0] = Φ(√λ). This approximation is accurate for λ→ 0 and λ→ +∞.
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Fig. 9. Trade-off between robustness and security. The plot is computed by varying Nv ; the ticks show the values of Nv for
η = 10−7.
The link with Spread-Spectrum for No > 0 is the following. The attacker estimates the secret key as
Kˆ = Y¯/∥Y¯∥ with Y¯ the average of the observations:
Y¯ = 1
No
No∑
i=1Yi = αk + 1No
No∑
i=1Xi = αk + X¯. (32)
If we assume that the hosts are independent white Gaussian vectors, then X¯ ∼ N (0, σ2XNo I). Now, Kˆ is
an equivalent key (ie. it belongs to the spherical cap) iff Y¯ belongs to the inner single-nappe hypercone:
D = k⊺Y¯/∥Y¯∥ ≥ cos(θ), which translates into
D = U1 +√λ√∑Nvi=1U2i ≥ τ = cos(θ), (33)
where U = (U1,⋯, UNv) is the projection of X¯ on a basis of RNv , whose first vector is k, divided by
σ2X/No so that U ∼ N (0, I). After the transformation that turns D into the r.v. F , it appears that this
latter has a noncentral F-distribution with a noncentrality parameter
λ = α2No/σ2X = NvNo.10− DWR10 . (34)
This provides the approximation (16) in the text.
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In the same way as above, F converges to a non central χ21 modelled as (U1 +√λ)2 when Nv →∞.
This makes P [D2 > τ2]→ P [(U1 +√λ)2 > κ2]. Parameter λ linearly increases with Nv as shown in (34).
Inspired by [21, Proof of Lemma 2.1], we write:
P [(U1 +√λ)2 > κ2] = P [U21 + λ2 + 2U1√λ > κ2]
= P [U1 > −1
2
√
λ + κ2 − Y 2
2
√
λ
] λ→∞→ 1
and so does Φ(√λ). In the end, limNv→∞ P [D > τ] = 1 which shows that the effective key length vanishes
to zero as Nv →∞ provided that No > 0.
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Fig. 10. Trade-off between robustness and security for ISS. The plot is computed by varying λ at DWR = 10 dB, Nv = 80,
and  = 10−2. The key length is estimated using the method of Sect. V-B (o) with Nt = 106 and the rare events estimator of
Sect. V-C2 with Nt = 5.104 and n = 80 (⋆).
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